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The objective of this study is to investigate whether the Portuguese firms that are 
listed in EURONEXT Lisbon engage opportunistic or efficient earnings management and 
to examine the effect of auditors’ size and dividend threshold on the selection of type of 
earnings management by the Portuguese managers. 
Using the sample of 33 publicly listed Portuguese firms in period 2010 - 2018, we 
examine the association between discretionary accruals and future profitability. If the 
association between discretionary accrual and future profitability is positive significant, 
the firms engage efficient earnings management. Otherwise, the firms engage 
opportunistic earnings management. Our result shows that the Portuguese firms tend to 
engage efficient earnings management. This finding is contradictory with the previous 
studies that indicate the type of earnings management engaged by Portuguese firms is 
opportunistic. However, the desire to meet dividend threshold can trigger the Portuguese 
firms to engage opportunistic earnings management. Furthermore, the big 4 auditors fail 
to give an additional effect to mitigate opportunistic earnings management practices. 
KEYWORDS: Earnings management; Auditors’ size; Dividend Threshold. 







O objetivo deste estudo é investigar se as empresas portuguesas cotadas na 
EURONEXT Lisboa praticam uma gestão de resultado oportunista ou eficiente e 
examinar o efeito da dimensão dos auditores e do limite de dividendos na seleção do tipo 
de gestão de resultados praticada pelos gestores portugueses. 
O estudo consiste na análise de uma amostra de 33 empresas portuguesas cotadas, 
durante o período de 2010 a 2018, no qual averiguamos a associação entre acréscimos 
discricionários e rentabilidade futura. Se a associação entre acréscimos discricionários e 
rentabilidade futura for positivamente significativa, as empresas praticam uma gestão de 
resultados eficiente. Caso contrário, as empresas praticam uma gestão de resultados 
oportunista.  
O nosso estudo indica que as empresas portuguesas tendem a praticar uma gestão de 
resultados eficiente. Este resultado é contraditório aos resultados obtidos de estudos 
anteriores, que indicam que as empresas portuguesas praticam uma gestão de resultados 
oportunista. O desejo de atingir o limite de dividendos pode levar as empresas 
portuguesas a envolverem-se numa gestão de resultados oportunista. Adicionalmente, as 
4 grandes empresas de auditoria não conseguem ajudar as empresas a mitigar a prática de 
uma gestão de resultados oportunista. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Gestão de Resultados; Dimensão dos Auditores; Limite de 
Dividendos. 
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TYPE OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND THE EFFECT OF AUDITORS’ SIZE 
AND DIVIDEND THRESHOLD: EVIDENCE FROM PORTUGAL 
By Joko Supriyanto 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to investigate whether Portuguese publicly traded firms engage in 
opportunistic or efficient earnings management in period 2010-2018. This study is 
motivated by the previous studies that indicate earnings management practices in Portugal 
tend to be opportunistic. Marques et al. (2011) found that Portuguese private firms 
manipulate earnings to minimize the “special payment on account” (SPA) that determine 
the tax liability of the firms. Ferreira et al. (2013) proved that the local politicians (in 
Portuguese municipalities) use earnings management to maintain earnings positive close 
to zero to signal their competence. Da Silva et al. (2017) documented that the Portuguese 
firms engage earnings management to meet dividend threshold. 
Scott (2012) classified earnings management into two types. First, opportunistic 
earnings management occurs when the managers use their discretion to maximize their 
own interests. Burgstahler & Dichev (1997), Robb (1998), Bauwhede et al. (2003), 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Comprix et al. (2012) suggest that earnings management 
is consistent with the opportunistic perspective. Second, efficient earnings management 
occurs when the managers use their discretion to enhance earnings informativeness to 
deliver private information. Previous studies also suggest that earnings management is 
consistent with the efficient perspective (e.g. Subramanyam, 1996; Krishnan, 2003; 
Siregar & Utama, 2008). 
Research in earnings management has been intensively explored in the literature; 
however, literature concerning determinants that affect the selection of a particular type 
of earnings management is quite limited. Therefore, this study also investigates whether 
auditors’ size and dividend threshold influence the type of earnings management selected 
by Portuguese firms. 
According to agency theory, monitoring mechanism is supposed to reduce conflict 
of interests between principal (shareholders) and agent (managers) and to prevent any 
opportunistic behaviours resulting from this conflict of interests. In this sense, Jensen & 
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Meckling (1976; p. 323) describe the audit function as an important role to harmonize 
interests of both principal and agent. Previous studies (Francis et al., 1999; Becker et al., 
1998; Bauwhede et al., 2003; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008; Alzoubi, 2016) find 
that auditors’ size mitigate opportunistic earnings management as firms that are audited 
by the big auditor firms show lower level of discretionary accruals. 
Dividend threshold also plays an important role to influence managers’ intention to 
conduct opportunistic earnings management. Daniel et al. (2008) find that firms conduct 
earnings management opportunistically to meet dividend threshold. Following Daniel et 
al. (2008), Atieh & Hussein (2012) also find that UK firms conduct earnings management 
opportunistically to meet dividend threshold. While Kasanen et al. (1996) provide 
evidence that opportunistic earnings management conducted by the finish firms motivated 
by the dividend threshold. Da Silva et al. (2017) find that dividend threshold triggers 
Portuguese firms to engage earnings management. 
The sample of this study consists of 33 Portuguese firms for the years 2010 to 2018. 
This study uses the data from 2010 to avoid the bias resulting from the effect of financial 
crisis which hit financial markets around the world which greatly distorted firms’ 
financial reporting from normal period.  
The results suggest that the type of earnings management that is conducted by the 
Portuguese firms tends to be more efficient. This evidence is in contrast with previous 
earnings management research in Portugal that indicate opportunistic (e.g. Marques et al., 
2011; Ferreira et al., 2013; Da Silva et al., 2017). However, we also find that the desire 
to meet dividend threshold can triggers the Portuguese firms to conduct opportunistic 
earnings management. This result is consistent with Da Silva et al. (2017) who found that 
Portuguese firms conduct earnings management to meet dividend threshold. Furthermore, 
in contrast with previous studies, we find that auditors’ size fails to provide additional 
effect on monitoring mechanism that constrain opportunistic earnings management. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence 
that Portuguese firms tend to engage efficient earnings management. This finding is 
contrary to the previous studies that indicate earnings management conducted by the 
Portuguese firms is opportunistic (Marques et al., 2011; Ferreira et al., 2013, Da Silva et 
al., 2017). Second, this study finds evidence that dividend threshold can triggers firms to 
select opportunistic earnings management. The information content of dividend signals 
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the economic condition of the firms; hence, the firms will do whatever is required to meet 
dividend threshold, including engaging opportunistic earnings management (DeAngelo 
et al., 1992; Da Silva et al., 2017). Third, this study fails to document the auditors’ size 
can constrain opportunistic earnings management practice in Portugal. Our result is 
inconsistent with the previous studies which suggest that auditors’ size can mitigate 
opportunistic earnings management (Francis et al., 1999; Becker et al., 1998). 
This study also offers some implications to the practice. First, the result shows that 
the Portuguese firms tend to engage efficient earnings management, which means that the 
investors can rely on the earnings figures reported by the Portuguese firms as they conduct 
earnings management to increase the informativeness of earnings to signal future 
profitability. Furthermore, Investors should realize that the big 4 auditors do not 
necessarily guarantee to restrict the Portuguese firms to engage opportunistic earnings 
management. Lastly, the investors should be aware that even though the firms distribute 
the dividend that may signal a good performance, there is still a potential that the firms 
engage opportunistic earnings management. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
previous literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample, 
the description of variables and the research design of this study. In section 4, we present 
the result of empirical analysis and a bunch of robustness checks. The study ends with a 
conclusion in section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Prior Research on Opportunistic and Efficient Earnings Management 
From the opportunistic perspective, managers engage in earnings management to 
cater to their own interests instead of the shareholders’ interests which they are supposed 
to fulfil (Scott, 2012). Previous studies investigated some incentives that trigger the firms 
engage opportunistic earnings management. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that 
managers commit in earnings management to avoid reporting losses or earnings decline. 
Robb (1998) provides evidence that bank managers conduct greater earnings management 
when analysts have already reached consensus in their earnings forecasts, thus they can 
beat the analysts’ forecasts. Comprix et al. (2012) document that managers manage 
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interim earnings reporting to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) document that the UK firms opportunistically conduct earnings management to 
meet analysts’ forecast by classification shifting of core expenses to non-recurring items. 
Bauwhede et al. (2003) prove that Belgium firms conduct income smoothing and manage 
earning to meet benchmark target of previous earnings.  
In Portugal, Marques et al (2011) find that Portuguese private firms manipulate 
earnings to minimize the “special payment on account” (SPA) that determine the tax 
liability of the firms. Ferreira et al. (2013) prove that the local politicians (in Portuguese 
municipalities) use earnings management to maintain earnings positive close to zero to 
signal their competence the aim for being re-elected. By managing the level of earnings 
in a certain level, the Portuguese politicians can signal to voters their competence. Da 
Silva et al. (2017) find that dividend threshold is one of the determinants that trigger 
Portuguese firms to conduct earnings management. 
In contrast, from the efficient perspective, managers use their discretion to enhance 
earnings informativeness in delivering private information. Subramanyam (1996) assume 
that discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management are efficient because they 
show a positive and significant association with future profitability. From this positive 
association, discretionary accruals show their ability to signal information about firms’ 
future profitability. Krishnan (2003) documents the significant positive relationship 
between discretionary accruals and stock return in the following three months after the 
fiscal end-year. This study indicates earnings management as a predictor for firms’ stock 
return. Siregar and Utama (2008) also show evidence that earnings management is 
consistent with the efficient perspective. 
 
2.2. Prior Research on Auditors’ Size and Earnings Management 
Auditing procedures play a significant role in monitoring mechanisms as they 
provide affirmation about the credibility of firms’ financial reporting and therefore the 
auditors should be independent in giving the verification about the credibility of the firms’ 
financial reporting (Alves, 2013). Bauwhede et al. (2003) argue that large auditors are 
more competent and/or independent than smaller auditors, thus provide a better 
monitoring system that constrain earnings management. The big auditor firms also have 
bigger cost than the small auditor firms when the audit failure occurs (Bauwhede et al., 
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2003). Such costs are quasi rent (DeAngelo, 1981) and reputation (Behn et al., 1997). The 
big auditor firms also have greater incentive to produce better audit quality because their 
partners can monitor and evaluate the auditing procedure more effectively (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1981). 
In the literature, the effect of auditors’ size on earnings management is somehow 
various. Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) show that the clients of big 6 
auditors report discretionary accrual less than the discretionary accrual reported by the 
clients of non-big 6 auditors. In China, Chen et al. (2011) compare the impact of audit 
quality on earnings management for State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and non-State-
owned Enterprises (NSOEs) and document that NSOEs audited by top 8 auditors report 
a significantly lower level of earnings management than for NSOEs audited by non-top 8 
auditors. Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2008) study the impact of audit quality produced 
by big 4 audit firms and non-big 4 audit firms to constrain earnings management. They 
document that big 4 audit firms produce better audit quality than non-big 4 audit firms to 
prevent earnings management. Alzoubi (2016) also finds similar results as the previous 
studies that there is a negative association between audit quality and earnings 
management. The level of earnings management is significantly less among firms audited 
by big 4 auditors than non-big 4 auditors. 
In contrary, Pio and Janin (2007) find that auditors’ size has no significant effect to 
mitigate the earnings management activities of French firms. The institutional governance 
setting in France (i.e. Civil Law System) explains the absence of supervisory effectiveness 
by the big 5 auditors. Yasar (2013) investigates the relationship between auditors’ size 
and earnings management in Turkey and similarly finds that there is no difference in audit 
quality between big 4 auditors and non-big auditors 4 to prevent earnings management 
practices. Yasar (2013) argue that the institutional setting in Turkey that does not 
encourage auditor firms to provide good quality audit mechanism (e.g. small fine and 
penalties are rarely applied to auditor firms when the audit failure occurs), therefore the 
auditors’ size does not significantly constrain earnings management practice in Turkey. 
Tsipouridou & Spathis (2012) argue that the strong economic bonding between auditors 
and their clients, in fact encourage auditors to compromise their judgement in providing 
audit opinion. Hence, Tsipouridou & Spathis (2012) find that auditors’ size does not affect 
the level of earnings management engaged by Greek firms. In Portugal, Alves (2013) 
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finds that the big 4 auditors fail to constrain earnings management practices engaged by 
the Portuguese firms. 
 
2.3. Prior Research on Dividend Threshold on Earnings Management 
Since Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller & Rock (1985) introduced the dividend 
signalling theory – which state that an increment in dividend payment indicates a better 
performance, conversely a decrease in dividend payment indicates a decrease in economic 
performance – it has been widely known that the firms are hesitant to cut dividend level. 
Brav et al. (2005) in Ross et al. (2010) show the survey result that state more than 90% 
CFOs as the respondents attempt to avoid dividend cut. The firms will do whatever is 
required to meet dividend threshold, including engaging opportunistic earnings 
management to avoid conveying bad signal to the market (DeAngelo et al., 1992).  
Previous studies show that dividend threshold is one of the important thresholds that 
triggers the firms to engage earnings management. Kasanen et al. (1996) document that 
firms conduct earnings management due to the existence of dividend threshold for smooth 
dividend payment by showing the positive significant association between reporting 
earnings and dividend-based targeted earnings. The firms will conduct income-
increasing earnings management to meet dividend target. Bennett & Bradbury (2007) find 
that dividend threshold triggers the asymmetry of earnings distribution, which is a proxy 
for earnings management.  
Furthermore, Daniel et al. (2008) study the direct impact of dividend threshold to 
discretionary accrual as a proxy for earnings management and find that dividend threshold 
has a positive direct impact on discretionary accrual. Replicating the model of Daniel et 
al. (2008), Atieh & Hussain (2012) find the supportive result of the previous studies that 
dividend threshold is a significant determinant of earnings management in UK. In 
Portugal, Da Silva et al. (2017) find that Portuguese firms engage earnings management 
to meet dividend threshold. 
 
2.4. Research Hypotheses 
As mentioned above, earnings management is classified into two types: efficient and 
opportunistic. Earnings management is opportunistic if managers use their discretion to 
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maximize their utility, thereby garbling earnings, while it is efficient if managers use their 
discretion to communicate private information about firm future profitability which is yet 
to be reflected in the historical cost-based earnings (Subramanyam, 1996; Siregar and 
Utama, 2008). Following these previous studies, we test whether earnings management 
is efficient or opportunistic by defining the ability of discretionary accruals to signal 
firms’ future profitability. If earnings management is efficient, then the discretionary 
accruals (earnings-management proxy) will have a significant positive relationship with 
future profitability. Otherwise, earnings management is opportunistic. Since the 
relationship can go either way – negative if earnings management is opportunistic and 
positive if efficient – then we formulate the first hypothesis as a non-directional 
hypothesis. 
H1a: There is a relationship between discretional accruals and future profitability. 
Auditing procedures play a significant role in monitoring mechanisms as they 
provide affirmation about the credibility of firms’ financial reporting and therefore the 
auditors should be independent in giving the verification about the credibility of the firms’ 
financial reporting (Alves, 2013). Big auditors viewed as a good verifier due to the 
competency and independency to provide monitoring system that prevent firms to engage 
opportunistic earnings management (Bauwhede et al., 2003). Large auditors also have 
great incentives to produce better auditing mechanism to detect and reveal the firms’ 
misreporting because the partners can be more effectively monitored in the large audit 
firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). Big auditors also face a greater cost when the audit 
failure occurs (Bauwhede et al., 2003). As a result, to preserve their reputation and to 
avoid legal lawsuit (Behn et al., 1997), the big auditors will be more conservative and 
will restrain the clients from using discretionary accruals. 
In this sense, numerous studies suggest that the big auditor firms constrain the firms 
to engage earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Van Tendeloo 
& Vanstraelen 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Alzoubi, 2016). Therefore, we expect that big 4 
auditors will constraint the firms from engaging opportunistic earnings management, and 
therefore we formulate the next hypothesis: 
H1b: The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is higher on firms 
audited by Big 4 auditors than on firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors.  
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Dividend signalling theory states that an increment in dividend payment indicates a 
better performance, conversely a decrease in dividend payment indicates a decrease in 
economic performance (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985). It has been widely 
known that the firms are hesitant to cut dividend level (Daniel et al., 2008). Brav et al. 
(2005) in Ross et al. (2010) show the survey result that state more than 90% CFOs as the 
respondents attempt to avoid dividend cut. The cut of dividend can be viewed as a bad 
signal for the economic condition of the firms. Thus, the firms will do everything required 
– include engaging opportunistic earnings management – to meet dividend threshold 
(DeAngelo et al., 1992).  
Previous studies find that dividend threshold is a determinant that triggers firms to 
conduct opportunistic earnings management. Kasanen et al. (1996) find that the firms 
engage earnings management due to the existence of dividend threshold to meet. Daniel 
et al. (2008) and Atieh & Hussein (2012) study the direct impact of dividend threshold to 
discretionary accrual as a proxy for earnings management and find that dividend threshold 
has a positive direct impact on discretionary accruals. The firms engage opportunistic 
earnings management to meet dividend threshold. Da Silva et al. (2017) find that 
Portuguese firms engage earnings management to meet dividend threshold. 
Thus, we expect that dividend threshold will trigger the firms to conduct 
opportunistic earnings management. Hence: 
H1c: The higher the level of dividend threshold, the lower the effect of discretionary 
accruals on future profitability. 
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
The sample for the study is composed of all the firms listed on the EURONEXT 
Lisbon in year 2010 – 2018. We exclude financial and real estate investment industries 
from the sample due to the difference accounting approach, thus the firms in financial or 
real estate investment industries may use different way in conducting earnings 
management. We also exclude the firms with incomplete data used to measure all the 
variables in this study. The final sample consists of 33 firms listed on the EURONEXT 
Lisbon. Table 3.1 shows the sample selection procedure. The data is collected from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream and the annual reports of the firms. 
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3.2. Variable Definition 
3.2.1. Future Profitability 
Previous studies measure future profitability with three proxies: Cash flow operation 
from the next year (CFOt+1), non-discretionary accrual (NDNIt+1), and earnings from the 
next year (EARNt+1) (Subramanyam, 1996; Krishnan, 2003). This study follows Siregar 
and Utama (2008) using three proxies to measure future profitability: 
 CFOt+1 = one-year ahead cash flows from operation 
 NDNIt+1 = one-year ahead non-discretionary net income (EARNt+1 – DACt+1) 
 ΔEARNt+1 = one-year ahead change in earnings (EARNt+1 – EARNt) 
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets. 
This study uses ΔEARNt+1 to measure future profitability due to the weakness of the 
proxy EARNt+1. Earnings consists of discretionary accruals, thus if there is a positive and 
significant relationship between discretionary accruals in year t and earnings in year t+1, 
it could be due to management creating other discretionary accruals in year t+1 and not 
an indication of efficient earnings management (Siregar and Utama, 2008). Table 3.3 
shows the significant correlation between discretionary accruals in year t and year t+1, 
which supports the argument. As a substitute for traditional earnings measures, we use 
change in earnings instead (ΔEARNt+1). Because earnings and discretionary accruals tend 
to have a stationary nature (Siregar and Utama, 2008). The use of change in earnings will 
control for the stationary nature of discretionary accruals (Siregar and Utama, 2008). 
Furthermore, we also use one-year ahead cash flows from operation (CFOt+1) and one-
year ahead non-discretionary net income (NDNIt+1). These two proxies do not have a 
discretionary-accrual element, so they do not have the inherent problems of earnings. 
 
3.2.2. Earnings Management 
The widely well-known proxy for earnings management is discretionary accruals. 
There are many models of discretionary accruals in earnings management literature. This 
study uses several models of discretionary accruals that are commonly used in the 
earnings management literature:  
a. Model Jones (1991) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀  
 
(1) 




ACCRit Total accruals in year t 
ΔREVit  Change in revenue from year t-1 to year t (REVt – REVt-1) 
PPEit  Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t 
All variables are scaled by the total assets year t-1 
 
b. Model Dechow et al. (1995) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 ] + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀  
Where: 
ΔRECit  Change in net account receivables from year t-1 to year t (RECt – RECt+1) 
All variables are scaled by the total assets year t-1 
 
c. Model Kasznik (1999) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 ] + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝜀  
Where: 
ΔCFOit        Change in cash flows from operation from year t-1 to year t (CFOt – CFOt-1) 
All variables are scaled by the total assets in year t-1 
d. Model Khotari et al. (2005) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀  
Where: 
ROAit  Return on assets in yeat t 
All variables are scaled by the total assets in year t-1 
Non-discretionary accruals (NDACit) are the fitted value of the above equations and 
discretionary accruals (DACit) are formed as the residuals. Following Subramanyam, 
(1996) and Siregar & Utama, (2008), we use a cross-sectional method by year. We 
estimate each model separately for each year. The cross-sectional method by firm industry 
is not used because we do not have enough sample firms for each industry. 
Based on the adjusted R2, one of the above models is selected to decompose 
discretionary and non-discretionary elements for the main analysis. The rest of the models 
will be analysed in the robustness check section. Table 3.4. shows the evaluation of the 
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al. (2005) model has the highest adjusted R2. Hence, we employ this model in our main 
analysis and the other models in sensitivity analysis.  
 
3.2.3. Auditors’ Size 
Auditing literature has focused mainly on the difference between big auditors and 
non-big auditors. Following Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2008) and Alves (2012) we 
measure variable auditors’ size with dummy variable, 1 if the auditor firms are big-4 
auditor, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2.4. Dividend Threshold 
We measure dividend threshold by dividend per share of the previous year. Daniel et 
al. (2008) state that the dividend per share in year t-1 is the dividend threshold that triggers 
firms to conduct earnings management.  
 
3.2.5. Leverage 
Following the existing literature, we measure variable leverage (LEV) by the total 
debt over total assets (Peasnell et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2008; Alves, 2013). 
 
3.2.6. Firms Size 
Following the previous studies, we measure variable firm size (SIZE) by the total 
assets scaled by the beginning total assets. (Bathacharya, 2001; Peasnell et al., 2005). 
 
3.3. Research Design 
In this section we describe our research design. To test H1a, whether the Portuguese 
firms engage efficient or opportunistic earnings management, we examine the 
relationship between discretionary accruals (DACit) and firms’ future profitability (Xit+1). 
This following equation is formulated through an ordinary least square approach: 
𝑋 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀  
The dependent variable of this study is future profitability (Xit+1). We use three 
proxies to measure firms’ future profitability. One-year ahead cash flows from operation 
(5) 
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(CFOit+1), one-year ahead non-discretionary net income (NDACit+1), and one-year ahead 
change in earnings (ΔEARNit+1).  
Earnings are formed by three elements: cash flows from operation (CFOit), non-
discretionary accruals (NDACit), and discretionary accruals (DACit). Variable DACit is the 
testing variable of this study. If the earnings management is efficient, the coefficient of 
DACit (β3) will be positive and if the coefficient of DACit (β3) is negative, the earnings 
management is opportunistic. The other variables: AUDITit (auditors’ size), dividend 
threshold (DIVit), leverage (LEVit) and firms’ size (SIZEit) are the control variables. i is 
for firms, t is year 2010 – 2018 and t+1 is year 2011-2019. 
Hypotheses 1b and 1c imply that the effect of DACit to future profitability (Xit+1) is 
moderated by the hypothesized variables (auditors’ size and dividend threshold). Hence, 
to test hypotheses H1b and H1c, we use the following model: 
𝑋 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐴𝐶  𝑥 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇
+ 𝛽 𝐷𝐴𝐶  𝑥 𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀  
In this study, we expect Hypothesis 1b: β4 > 0, Hypothesis 1c: β5 < 0. As mentioned 
in the hypothesis development, we use moderating variables to observe the incremental 
effect of these moderating variables (AUDITit and DIVit) to the association between DACit 
and future profitability (Xit+1). For example, if AUDITit equals to zero, then the effect of 
discretionary accruals on future profitability is β3, and if the AUDITit equals to one, then 
the effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is β3 + β4. β4 is the difference 
between AUDITit equals to zero and AUDITit equals to one, which is the coefficient of the 
moderating variables. 
To control omitted factors of the variation over time, we use a fixed-effect 
specification for year. Another statistical issue is related to a multicollinearity problem. 
To check whether our variables have a multicollinearity issue, we compute Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF). Table 3.6 shows the result of VIF of the independent variables in 
this research. In general, a multicollinearity problem exists if the value of VIF exceeds 
10. Thus, the independent variables of this research do not have a multicollinearity 
problem. 
(6) 
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3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.7 shows the descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical models. 
On average, the sample firms of this study have positive future cash flows from operation 
and positive non-discretionary accruals earnings (CFOt+1 and NDNIt+1). The sample firms 
have slightly inclining earnings with the mean of ΔEARNt+1 positive 0.005479. The means 
of discretionary accruals is 0.000000 which may be concluded that on average, the 
Portuguese firms in our sample almost do not engage earnings management in their 
financial reporting. Most of our sample firms are audited by big-4 auditors (69.3%). The 
average dividend per share of the sample is 0.121630. 
Table 3.8 presents the Pearson correlation among variables. The negative and 
significant correlation between CFO and DAC is consistent with the smoothing earnings 
management; when the firms have high positive cash flows from operation, they engage 
earnings management to reduce the level of cash flows from operation, and vice versa. 
Future cash flow from operation has positive significant correlation with the firm size, 
indicating that large firms have high positive cash flows from operation.  
The positive correlation between DIV and CFO indicates that the firms that pay 
higher dividend per share have higher cash flow from the operation in the following year. 
Table 3.8 indicates that the large firms tend to be audited by the big-4 auditors, shown by 
the positive significant correlation between SIZE and AUDIT. The positive correlation 
between SIZE and DIV indicates that the larger firms the higher level of dividend per 
share that firms distribute. 
 
4. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
4.1. Opportunistic or Efficient Earnings Management? 
The results from regression of the first research model (equation 5) are shown in table 
4.1. the regression result supports hypothesis 1a with significant level at 5%. The 
coefficient of variable DACt is positive (significant level at 5%) with two out of three 
variables as proxies for future profitability (CFOt+1 and NDNIt+1), shown in columns (1) 
and (2). This finding tends to be consistent with the perspective of efficient earnings 
management. The Portuguese firms tend to engage earnings management to increase 
earnings informativeness to signal private information about future profitability of the 
firms. The finding of this study is contrary with the previous studies in Portugal that 
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indicate earnings management in Portugal is opportunistic. Portuguese firms engage 
opportunistic earnings management to minimize tax liability (Marques et al., 2011) and 
to meet dividend threshold (Da Silva et al., 2017). Ferreira et al. (2013) show that 
politicians in public municipalities in Portugal engage earnings management to show their 
competence for campaign purpose.  
Our result is consistent with the previous studies. Subramanyam (1996) provides 
evidence that the earnings management improves the predictability of reported earnings, 
and therefore predicts the future profitability. Krishnan (2003) finds that managers use 
accruals earnings to communicate their private information, thereby improving the ability 
of earnings to reflect underlying economic value. Siregar & Utama (2008) prove that 
Indonesian firms engage efficient earnings management to signal future profitability of 
the firms. 
 
4.2. The Effect of Auditors’ Size and Dividend Threshold 
The following research hypotheses (H1b and H1c) address the effect of auditors’ size 
(AUDITit,), dividend threshold (DIVit) on the relationship between discretionary accrual 
(DACit) and future profitability, which is proxied by CFOit+1, NDNIit+1 and ΔEARNit+1.  
Table 4.2 presents the regression result of equation 6. The regression result shows 
that the interaction variable DACit*AUDITit does not have significant association with the 
proxies of future profitability (CFOit+1, NDNIit+1 and ΔEARNit+1). These findings indicate 
that the auditors’ size fails to provide a monitoring mechanism to prevent opportunistic 
earnings management practices. Consistent with Alves, (2013) that finds the big 4 
auditors fail to constrain earnings management practices engaged by the Portuguese 
firms. Pio and Janin (2007) find that auditors’ size has no significant effect to mitigate 
the earnings management activities of French firms. The institutional governance setting 
in France (i.e. Civil Law System) explains the absence of supervisory effectiveness by 
the big 5 auditors. Yasar (2013) investigates the relationship between auditors’ size and 
earnings management in Turkey and similarly finds that there is no difference in audit 
quality between big 4 auditors and non-big auditors 4 to prevent earnings management 
practices. 
In contrast with the hypothesis 1b, which expects that the interaction of auditors’ size 
and discretionary accruals has a positive significant association with future profitability. 
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This may relate to the condition of the auditing industry in Portugal, which is extremely 
competitive. The number of registered auditors in CMVM for public interest of 
investment scheme (Auditores de EIP – Organismos de Investimento Colectivo) is much 
bigger (377 registered auditors in 2019) than the number of firms that are obliged to use 
the auditors’ service. In this situation, the firms have bargaining power that may influence 
auditors’ decisions to conclude audit opinion. Thus, unsurprisingly we saw the 
involvement of a big auditor firm in Luanda Leaks scandal that occurred recently in 
Portugal.  
The interaction variable DACit*EXDIVit has a significant negative association with 
the variable future profitability (CFOit+1). This finding indicates that the expected 
dividend can triggers the firms to conduct opportunistic earnings management. The result 
of this study is consistent with the previous studies which show that dividend threshold 
triggers the firms to engage opportunistic earnings management (Kasanen et al., 1996; 
Daniel et al., 2008; Atieh and Hussain, 2012; Da Silva et al., 2017). Thus, hypothesis 1c 
is supported. 
The underlying rational of this finding is due to the fact that dividend cut can convey 
a bad signal to the market (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985), thus the firms will 
do everything required – include engaging opportunistic earnings management – to meet 
dividend threshold (DeAngelo et al., 1992). Brav et al. (2005) in Ross et al. (2010) show 
the survey result that states more than 90% CFOs as the respondents attempt to avoid 
dividend cut. 
 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our findings. 
Firstly, we measure discretionary accruals using other alternative models (Jones, 1991; 
Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999). Table 4.3 shows the result of hypothesized variables 
using other discretionary models. In Model 1, variable DAC shows positive sign to two 
proxies of future profitability (CFOt+1 and NDNIt+1) using other discretionary models. 
The positive association between DAC and two proxies of future profitability (CFOt+1 
and NDNIt+1) indicate that the Portuguese firms tend to engage efficient earnings 
management. Furthermore, the auditors’ size fails to influence the relationship between 
discretionary accrual and future profitability, showed by the interaction variable 
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DAC*AUDIT insignificantly associated with future profitability proxies (CFOit+1, 
NDNIit+1 and ΔEARNit+1). For the interaction variable DAC*DIV slightly negative 
significant with variable future profitability (CFOit+1) which indicate that dividend 
threshold trigger Portuguese firms to engage opportunistic earnings management. Hence, 
the result is consistent with our main analysis. 
Second robustness check is performed to confirm that the sovereign debt crisis in 
Portugal in 2010 to 2014 will not affect the result of main analysis of the study. The 
regression was reperformed by excluding period 2010 – 2014. The result does not differ 
from main analysis that indicate the Portuguese firms tends to engage efficient earnings 
management. 
In equation 6 of our research, we use two moderating variables in the same model. 
To capture better moderating effect of each moderating variable, we break down research 
model 2 (equation 6) into several sub-models, with only one moderating variable in each 
model. Thus, we have the following model: 
𝑋 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐴𝐶  𝑥 𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀  
Where: 
Dk = AUDIT, k1 = DIV. 
The results of the above model are similar with our main analysis results. 
We change variable DIV as dummy variable to capture the existence of dividend 
threshold. Value 1 if the firms distribute the dividend in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
The result shows similar with the main analysis that indicate the dividend threshold 
encourage the Portuguese firms to engage opportunistic earnings management. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper we investigate whether Portuguese firms engage opportunistic or 
efficient earnings management. Furthermore, we study the effect of auditors’ size and 
dividend threshold on the selection of type of earnings management. Hypotheses are 
tested on a sample of 33 Portuguese firms that are listed in EURONEXT Lisbon in period 
2010-2018. We begin by defining whether Portuguese firms conduct opportunistic or 
efficient earnings management. Our study documents that the type of earnings 
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management favoured by publicly listed firms in Portugal tends to be efficient. Our result 
is contrary with previous studies that indicate the Portuguese firms engage opportunistic 
earnings management practice to meet a certain interest (Marques et al., 2011; Ferreira et 
al., 2013; Da Silva et al., 2017). Further analysis reveals that the big-4 auditors fails to 
provide monitoring system that prevent opportunistic earnings management practice in 
Portugal. This result is consistent with Alves (2013). The institutional matters that allow 
the management of the firms has powerful bargaining power that may influence auditors 
to provide audit opinion. Next, we find that the dividend threshold can triggers the firms 
to engage opportunistic earnings management. This finding is consistent with the existing 
literature (Kasanen, 1996; Daniel et al., 2008; Atieh & Hussein, 2012; Da Silva et al., 
2017). 
Our findings provide several contributions to the literature. We find the type of 
earnings management engaged by Portuguese firms is efficient. Our result extends the 
existing literature of type of earnings management which is mainly focused on the 
decentralized and big markets such as US and UK. Second, our study extends the current 
literature in earnings management in providing evidence that dividend threshold triggers 
the firms to engage opportunistic earnings management. Finally, we study the 
effectiveness of auditors’ size in Portugal to prevent the opportunistic earnings 
management. The results show that the big-4 auditors fail to provide a monitoring 
function that prevents opportunistic earnings management. 
The study also provides some implications to the practice. First, based on the result 
of our study, investors can rely on the earnings figures reported by the publicly listed 
Portuguese firms as they engage earning management to increase the informativeness of 
earnings to signal future profitability. Furthermore, investors should be aware that the big 
4 auditors do not necessarily guarantee to prevent the Portuguese firms to engage 
opportunistic earnings management. Investor can rely on the Audit Quality Indicators 
(AQI) that are released by the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) 
in 2020 to assure the audit monitoring mechanism that prevent opportunistic earnings 
management practices. Moreover, the investors should realize that even though the firms 
distribute the dividend that may signal a good firm performance, there is a potential that 
the firms still engage opportunistic earnings management. Lastly, the result of this study 
shows that the effect of auditors’ size lowers the association between discretionary 
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accruals and future profitability. It means that the big 4 auditors in Portugal fail to 
constrain opportunistic earnings management practices. This finding could suggest to the 
regulatory bodies to apply stricter evaluation for registered auditors and tougher penalty 
for the audit failure. 
There are some spotted limitations to our study. First, it is still questionable whether 
discretionary accruals models accurately decompose total accruals into non-discretionary 
and discretionary elements. Thus, there is the possibility of misclassifying the element of 
discretionary and non-discretionary element. If some element of non-discretionary 
accrual is mistakenly classified as discretionary accruals, then this may explain the 
positive association between discretionary accruals and future profitability. Second, the 
sample firms of this study are quite small, which may influence the result of this study. 
However, this limitation is an immediate consequence of the small market like in 
Portugal.  
There are two ways to manage earnings. Earnings are managed through the accruals 
manipulation without affecting cash flows (discretionary accrual earnings management). 
Second, earnings are managed through real activities that affect the cash flow of the firms 
(real earnings management). Future research could use alternative models to decompose 
discretionary and non-discretionary elements such as real earnings management model 
(Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Future research could use variable audit quality by using alternative measurement 
such as auditors’ expertise, auditors’ independency to investigate the effect of audit as 
monitoring mechanism to prevent opportunistic earnings management practice. 
Our research is not intended to identify which variable is the best to measure future 
profitability. Future research could try to identify which variable is the best or identify 
another variable to measure future profitability. 
The last recommendation for future research is that future research could consider 
alternative internal and external factors that may affect the selection of type of earnings 
management, such as analysts’ forecasts, debt constraint, corporate governance system, 
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List of Sample Company 
NO FIRMS 
1 TOYOTA CAETANO PORTUGAL SA 
2 MARTIFER SGPS SA 
3 TEIXEIRA DUARTE SA 
4 SONAE INDUSTRIA SGPS SA 
5 MOTA EGIL SGPS SA 
6 REN REDES ENERGETICAS NACIONAIS SGPS SA 
7 EDP ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL SA 
8 PHAROL SGPS SA 
9 NOS SGPS SA 
10 SONAECOM SGPS SA 
11 JERONIMOS MARTINS SGPS SA 
12 SONAE SGPS SA 
13 NAVIGATOR COMPANY SA 
14 SEMAPA SOCIEDADE DE INVESTIMENTO E GESTAO 
15 ALTRI SGPS SA 
16 INAPA INVESTIMENTOS PARTICIPACOES E GESTAO 
17 SONAE CAPITAL SGPS SA 
18 CORTICEIRA AMORIM SGPS SA 
19 RAMADA INVESTIMENTOS E INDUSTRIA SA 
20 CTT CORREIOS DE PORTUGAL SA 
21 COFINA SGPS SA 
22 FUTEBOL CLUBE DE PORTO FUTEBOL SAD 
23 SPORTING CLUBE DE PORTUGAL FUTEBOL SAD 
24 GALP ENERGIA SGPS SA 
25 NOVABASE SGPS SA 
26 REDITUS SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE PARTICIPACOES SOCIAIS SA 
27 GLINTT GLOBAL INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES SA 
28 LISGRAFICA IMPRESSAO E ARTES GRAFICAS SA 
29 LITHO FORMAS SA 
30 ESTORIL SOL SGPS SA 
31 SPORT LISBOA E BENFICA FUTEBOL SAD 
32 IMOBILIRIA CONSTRUTORA GRAO PARA SA 
Table A.1 
Sample selection procedure 
Total number of firms listed in Euronext Lisbon in year 2010 – 2018  43 
Firms in financial and real estate investment industries (8) 
Firms with incomplete data (2) 
   Total sample firms 33 
Number of years 9 
   Total observations 297 
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33 IBERSOL SGPS SA 
TOTAL SAMPLE 33 FIRMS 
  
1 BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUESE 
2 BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO 
3 MAXIRENT 
4 FLEXDEAL SIMFE 
5 PATRIS INVESTIMENTOS 
6 RAIZE-INSTITUICAO DE PAGAMENTOS 
7 SONAGI LIMITED DATA 
8 NEXPONOR SICAFI REIT 
TOTAL FIRMS IN FINANCIAL AND REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY 8 FIRMS 
  
1 SOCIEDADE DAS AGUAS 
2 FENALU 




































t = year 2010 – 2018 
t+1 = year 2011 – 2019 
* p value with significant level 1% 
Table A.4 
Evaluation of earnings management models 
EM models Adjusted R2 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Mean 
Jones (1991) 0.0657 0.0481 0.1513 0.3190 0.1002 0.0395 0.0835 0.0252 0.2011 0.1148 
Dechow et al. (1995) 0.0613 0.0243 0.0416 0.3286 0.0827 0.0936 0.0486 0.0256 0.1743 0.0978 
Kasznik (1999) 0.0421 0.0069 0.0381 0.3795 0.0699 0.2542 0.5149 0.0527 0.2051 0.1737 
Kothari et al. (2005) 0.0359 0.7314 0.2198 0.8649 0.0746 0.6380 0.3107 0.9834 0.6224 0.4979 
Notes: 
Model Jones (1991) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀  
Model Dechow et al. (1995) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 ] + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀  
Model Kasznik (1999) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 ] + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝜀  
Model Kothari et al. (2005) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀  
ACCRit is total accrual. ΔREVit is change in revenue from year t-1 to year t (REVt – REVt-1). PPEit is gross property, plant, and 
equipment in year t. ΔRECit is change in net A/R from year t-1 to year t (RECt – RECt-1). ΔCFOit is change in cash flow from 
operation from year t-1 to year t (CFOt – CFOt-1). ROAit is return on assets in year t. 







Variables Source Definition 
Dependent variables   
CFOt+1 a One-year ahead cash flows from operation 
NDNIt+1 a One-year ahead non-discretionary accrual net income 
(EARNt+1 – DACt+1) 
ΔEARNt+1 a One-year ahead change in earnings (EARNt+1 – EARNt) 
   
Independent variables   
CFO a Cash flow from operation 
NDAC a Non-discretionary accruals components. The fitted value 
of discretionary accrual models (Jones, 1991; Dechow et 
al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999; Kothari et al., 2005) 
DAC a Discretionary accruals components. The residual value of 
discretionary accrual models (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Kasznik, 1999; Kothari et al., 2005) 
AUDIT b Auditors’ size. Dummy variable. Value 1 if the firms 
audited by the big-4 auditors. Value 0, otherwise. 
DIV a Dividend Threshold. Dividend per share in year t 
LEV a Firm leverage. Total debt scaled by total assets 
SIZE a Firm size. Total assets scaled by the beginning total 
assets. 
a Thomson Reuters DataStream 


















Variance Inflation Factors 
Variables Coefficient variance Uncentered VIF Centered VIF 
CFO 0.0077 4.8209 3.5023 
NDAC 0.0004 1.0988 1.0427 
DAC 0.0098 2.7756 2.7756 
AUDIT 0.0001 5.3186 1.2714 
DIV 0.0003 1.5688 1.2301 
LEV 0.0000 6.3155 1.4489 
SIZE 0.0002 3.4882 1.7912 
Notes: 
CFO = cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-discretionary accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, 
AUDIT = Auditors’ size. Value 1 if the firm is audited by big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise, DIV = Dividend 





































 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation 
CFOt+1 0.053301 0.045524 0.475827 -0.318571 0.088685 
NDNIt+1 0.009034 0.019755 0.887470 -2.608364 0.193365 
ΔEARNt+1 0.005479 0.002110 3.106076 -2.365952 0.265951 
CFO 0.050530 0.050091 0.427859 -3.112828 0.082490 
NDAC -0.046975 -0.041309 1.130307 -0.262469 0.202691 
DAC 0.000000 0.002460 0.314615 -0.259293 0.064866 
DIV 0.121630 0.031000 2.300000 0.000000 0.232202 
LEV 0.376277 0.392600 0.831583 0.205965 0.205664 
SIZE 0.356193 0.229037 1.375525 0.012743 0.366567 
n 297 297 297 297 297 
      
   Proportion  Proportion 
   Dummy = 1  Dummy = 0 
AUDIT   69.3%  30.7% 
Notes: 
CFOt+1 = one-year ahead cash flows, NDNIt+1 = one-year ahead non-discretionary net income, ΔEARNt+1 
= one-year ahead change in earnings,  CFO = cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-discretionary 
accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, AUDIT = Auditors’ size. Value 1 if the firm is audited by big 4 
auditors and 0 otherwise, DIV = Dividend threshold. Dividend per share in year t, LEV = firms’ leverage, 







 CFOt+1 NDNIt+1 ΔEARNt+1 CFO NDAC DAC AUDIT DIV LEV SIZE 
CFOt+1 1.0000          
NDNIt+1 0.4711 
0.0000*** 


































































































CFOt+1 = one-year ahead cash flows, NDNIt+1 = one-year ahead non-discretionary net income, ΔEARNt+1 = one-year ahead change in earnings,  CFO = 
cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-discretionary accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, AUDIT = Auditors’ size. Value 1 if the firm is audited by big 
4 auditors and 0 otherwise, DIV = Dividend threshold. Dividend per share in year t, LEV = firms’ leverage, SIZE = firms’ size. 






Regression of future profitability on discretionary accruals, other earnings component, and 
control variables. 
Variables Expected sign CFOt+1 NDNIt+1 ΔEARNt+1 










































     
n  297 297 297 
Adjusted R2  0.5558 0.1948 0.5737 
F-statistic  10.4964 2.8367 11.2135 
p-value (F-statistic)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
CFOt+1 = one-year ahead cash flows, NDNIt+1 = one-year ahead non-discretionary net income, 
ΔEARNt+1 = one-year ahead change in earnings,  CFO = cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-
discretionary accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, AUDIT = Auditors’ size. Value 1 if the firm is 
audited by big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise, DIV = Dividend threshold. Dividend per share in year t, LEV 
= firms’ leverage, SIZE = firms’ size. 






















Regression of future profitability on discretionary accruals, discretionary accruals-auditors’ 
size, discretionary accruals-dividend threshold, and control variables. 
Variables Expected sign CFOt+1 NDNIt+1 ΔEARNt+1 






















































     
n  297 297 297 
Adjusted R2  0.5606 0.1971 0.5746 
F-statistic  10.2100 2.7723 10.7538 
p-value (F-statistic)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
CFOt+1 = one-year ahead cash flows, NDNIt+1 = one-year ahead non-discretionary net income, 
ΔEARNt+1 = one-year ahead change in earnings,  CFO = cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-
discretionary accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, AUDIT = Auditors’ size. Value 1 if the firm is 
audited by big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise, DIV = Dividend threshold. Dividend per share in year t, LEV 
= firms’ leverage, SIZE = firms’ size. 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
 
  





Hypothesis analysis with other discretionary models 
 CFOt+1 Sig NDNIt+1 Sig ΔEARNt+1 Sig 
Model 1       
DAC       
Jones (1991) +  +  - ** 
Dechow et al. (1995) +  + * - ** 
Kasznik (1999) +  +  - ** 
       
Model 2       
DAC*AUDIT       
Jones (1991) +  -  +  
Dechow et al. (1995) +  -  +  
Kasznik (1999) +  -  +  
DAC*DIV       
Jones (1991) - ** -  -  
Dechow et al. (1995) - * -  -  
Kasznik (1999) -  +  -  
Notes: 
CFOt+1 = one-year ahead cash flows, NDNIt+1 = one-year ahead non-discretionary net income, 
ΔEARNt+1 = one-year ahead change in earnings,  CFO = cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-
discretionary accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, AUDIT = Auditors’ size. Value 1 if the firm 
is audited by big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise, DIV = Dividend threshold. Dividend per share in year 
t, LEV = firms’ leverage, SIZE = firms’ size. 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
 
